




*Consultancy Ltd*

Security Risk Management

**BREEAM Hea 06 Security Needs Assessment.  
Cliffe Hill Farm, Markfield. LE67 9QB**



Source – UMC Architects

Email: [info@kabsec.co.uk](mailto:info@kabsec.co.uk)

15<sup>th</sup> September 2025

Website: <https://kabsecconsultancy.uk>

24473-KAB-ZZ-ZZ-RP-Y-REVB

## **Section 1**

### **Introduction**

|                                   |       |          |
|-----------------------------------|-------|----------|
| <b>Purpose of the Report</b>      | ..... | <b>2</b> |
| <b>BREEAM Hea 06 Requirements</b> | ..... | <b>3</b> |
| <b>Site Location</b>              | ..... | <b>4</b> |

## **Section 2**

### **Security Needs Assessment**

|                                  |       |                |
|----------------------------------|-------|----------------|
| <b>Executive Summary</b>         | ..... | <b>5</b>       |
| <b>Developed Theory</b>          | ..... | <b>6 -7</b>    |
| <b>Crime Data</b>                | ..... | <b>8</b>       |
| <b>Area Audit</b>                | ..... | <b>9</b>       |
| <b>Site Audit</b>                | ..... | <b>10</b>      |
| <b>Consultation</b>              | ..... | <b>11</b>      |
| <b>General Risk</b>              | ..... | <b>12</b>      |
| <b>Site Specific Risk</b>        | ..... | <b>12</b>      |
| <b>Identified Design Threats</b> | ..... | <b>13</b>      |
| <b>Recommendations</b>           | ..... | <b>14 – 20</b> |
| <b>Other Considerations</b>      | ..... | <b>21</b>      |

### **Appendices**

|                   |                  |
|-------------------|------------------|
| <b>Appendix A</b> | Crime Data       |
| <b>Appendix B</b> | Crime Data       |
| <b>Appendix C</b> | Standards List   |
| <b>Appendix D</b> | Site Information |
| <b>Appendix E</b> | SQSS Credentials |

# Section 1

## Introduction

2

### Purpose of the report

This report defines a **Security Needs Assessment (SNA)** completed by KABSEC Consultancy in support of the new development at:

**Land at Junction 22 of the M1  
Cliffe Hill Farm  
Markfield.  
LE67 9QB**

The SNA considers security threats to the proposed development and security vulnerabilities apparent in the architectural designs and proposed uses. The SNA follows a security design methodology to provide security recommendations that should be designed and specified in future project stages. These recommendations are specifically intended to mitigate security risks to the development, its users and the surrounding area.

The site-specific SNA includes the following:

1. A **virtual visual audit** of the site and surroundings, identifying environmental cues and features pertinent to the security of the proposed development.
2. Details of the formal **consultation with relevant stakeholders**, including the Police Design Out Crime Officer (DOCO) or Counter-Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA) to obtain a summary of crime and disorder issues in the immediate vicinity of the proposed development.
3. **Identify risks** specific to buildings and the proposed, likely or potential user groups of those buildings and **propose recommendations for security improvements**.
4. Identify any **detrimental effect** the development may have on the existing community.

The purpose of the assessment is to inform stakeholder decision making and allow the identification and evaluation of security recommendations and solutions.

**The content of this report may be deemed confidential.**

**This document should be dealt with in accordance with employer disclosure requirements.**

## BREEAM Hea 06 Security - Requirements

**“A Suitably Qualified Security Specialist (SQSS) conducts an evidence-based Security Needs Assessment (SNA) during or prior to Concept Design (RIBA Stage 2 or equivalent)”**

**BREEAM** awards a point towards a development’s rating if an SNA is completed and recommendations from that report (this document) are implemented.

The aim of Hea 06 is to recognise and encourage effective measures to promote;

### Security of Site and Buildings

A credit for this element is achieved if:

1. A Suitably Qualified Security Specialist (SQSS) conducts an evidence-based Security Needs Assessment (SNA) during or prior to Concept Design (RIBA Stage 2 or equivalent). The purpose of the SNA will be to identify attributes of the proposal, site and surroundings which may influence the approach to security for the development.
2. The SQSS develops a set of security controls and recommendations for incorporation into the proposals. Those controls and recommendations shall directly relate to the threats and assets identified in the preceding SNA.
3. The controls and recommendations shall be incorporated into proposals and implemented in the as-built development. Any deviation from those controls and recommendations shall be justified and agreed with the SQSS.

**Kevin Burrows of KABSEC Consultancy acted as SQSS for this Security Needs Assessment.**

**Kevin is listed as a SABRE assessor by the BRE/Security Institute.**

**Kevin is listed as a fully licensed Secured by Design consultant, as shown at: [SBD Consultant](#).**

**Initial SNA requirements were completed on:**

**DATE – 28.5.25**

**RIBA Stage 2 (to NC V6)**

## Site Location




Image – Google Maps

The site is located at the location of ‘Land at Junction 22 of the M1, Cliffe Hill Farm.’

In the locality of the site, Whitwick Road is in Copt Oak, Markfield and in Hinckley and Bosworth district. LE67 9QB is located in the Markfield, Stanton and Fieldhead electoral ward, within the constituency of Bosworth.

Risk from neighbours would be considered to be ‘low risk’.

The immediate surrounding area is mostly rural with the nearby residential area of Markfield to the south of the site.

Site location makes it ideal for access onto the national highway network.

There are no other identifiable neighbours to generate any form of PALS (publicly accessible locations) concerns.

## Executive Summary

This assessment has been produced on behalf of **Caddick Developments Limited** to assist with the security provision related to the new development of six individual units of varying sizes comprising a logistics site planned at Cliffe Hill Farm, Markfield.

This is an early consultation in respect of the proposed industrial units and the development is designated a speculative development – there are currently no details of any tenants.

Development proposals for the site is to add a new build development to a largely rural area with some existing passive surveillance opportunities to and from both neighbouring properties and the surrounding area.

Features that may improve security provision in the future are included and can be used as advisory comments within the assessment, but most physical protection elements are deemed essential within any category of fit out.

### Site Details.

**Description of development:** “Redevelopment of the site at Cliffe Hill Farm at J22 of the M1 for storage and distribution uses (Class B8), general industry (Class B2), ancillary office space (Class E(g)(i)), together with associated development including access, landscaping, earthworks, ancillary infrastructure, and parking”

**Site Area:** 69.79 ac / 28.24 Ha

**Floor Area:** 697,440 sq ft

Site information and images are contained within Appendix D.

## Developed theory

The foremost theory used to reduce the likelihood of criminal activity within planning and construction disciplines is crime prevention through environmental design. (CPTED).

**1. Physical protection** This is the application of physical security measures to prevent or deter unauthorised access

**2. Surveillance opportunity** Ensuring there are multiple surveillance opportunities (natural, formal and informal) ensures the development is protected from casual intrusion and opportunist criminals.

**3. Access Control** Both natural and man-made access control measures can be applied in this context to create single, clearly identifiable points of entry to the site or site buildings

**4. Territoriality** This can be the actual definition or subconscious assertion that the development belongs, although not formally, to a legitimate user group.

**5. Maintenance** Ensuring an area remains well-maintained in the future will reduce the likelihood of further ASB, loitering and criminality.

All five principles are considered within this assessment.

KABSEC Consultancy are proponents of the ISO 22341 standard, a document that has essentially taken ageing CPTED principles and modernised/updated to inform today's security need. The KABSEC assessment is again cognisant of ISO 22341 concepts with relevant interventions included.

Physical protection elements are designed to achieve, as a minimum, the requirements of Secured by Design. The principles of the SABRE scheme are also considered, so where physical protection elements may be restricted, then adequate and appropriate mitigation is required to provide sufficient protection.

## Layering Security Measures

**Perimeter Security:** This is the outermost layer and involves measures to secure the physical boundaries of a facility. It can include features like fences, walls, gates, access control points, and barriers to prevent unauthorised entry.

**Access Control:** Access control is a critical layer that regulates who can enter and exit a facility. It includes measures like card readers, keypads, biometric scanners, and security personnel who monitor and control access to buildings or specific areas within a facility.

**Security Surveillance:** Security cameras and monitoring systems provide continuous surveillance, recording activities, and providing a deterrence factor. They can also be used for investigations in case of incidents.

**Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS):** IDS systems are designed to detect unauthorised entry or security breaches. They include sensors, alarms, and notifications to alert security personnel when there's a breach.

**Security Lighting:** Adequate lighting is essential for deterring criminals and enhancing visibility. Well-lit areas are less likely to be targeted for criminal activity.

**Physical Barriers:** These are additional layers within a facility, such as secure doors, reinforced windows, safes, and locks, designed to protect specific assets or areas.

**Security Personnel:** Trained security personnel, such as guards or receptionists, provide a human presence to monitor access, respond to incidents, and enforce security policies.

**Security Policies and Procedures:** Effective security also relies on well-defined policies and procedures that govern how security measures are implemented and enforced. This includes protocols for handling incidents, access control, and emergency response.

**Emergency Preparedness:** Having plans and resources in place for emergencies, such as fires, natural disasters, or security breaches, is crucial. This includes evacuation plans, fire suppression systems, and emergency communication systems.

**Visitor Management:** Properly managing and monitoring visitors to a facility is essential. This can include sign-in procedures, visitor badges, and escort requirements for visitors in secure areas.

**Employee Training:** Ensuring that employees are trained in security awareness and know how to follow security protocols is a fundamental layer of physical security.

Each of these layers contributes to the overall security of a facility, and organisations typically assess their specific needs and risks to determine which layers are most appropriate for their situation. The multi-layered approach to physical security is more effective than relying on a single security measure.


## Crime Data

Crime and Disorder datasets for **Bosworth, Ratby, Groby, Markfield and Stanton** neighbourhood area of Leicestershire Police have been obtained from the Police.uk website with reference to the other private sector online data. Police.uk data is the only one which can be regarded as ‘fully audited’.

Where additional but relevant neighbourhood data is required, then the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and affiliated websites are used. This site is another fully audited Government controlled open-source site that allows members of the public and professionals alike to review recorded statistics in respect of chosen neighbourhoods.

These websites allow for limited data trawls to be performed but provide datasets which allow a site risk designation to be assigned. For this site assessment, the postcode **LE67 9QB** has been used as a centre point for collation of crime datasets.

The below shows the extent of the **Bosworth, Ratby, Groby, Markfield and Stanton neighbourhood area**, where the development site is situated.



Statistical datasets are shown in Appendices A & B.

## Environmental Visual Audit

***“A visual audit of the site and surroundings, identifying environmental cues and features pertinent to the security of the proposed development”***

This report aims to identify both actual and potential vulnerabilities, to futureproof against more likely future crime trends. All proposals are made to provide long term cost benefits to both landlord and/or tenants from physical protection elements.

The scope of this security needs assessment considers all elements of the whole site, the new building structure and fit out.

The proposed development of the site does not affect its rural surroundings although it will not be in keeping with the immediate area.

Development of the site must be viewed positively when assessing risk. The development of the site will bring employment and enterprise opportunities to the area and, given building methods are now far more resilient, updated aesthetics have been (academically) shown to impact on the subconscious of both user and offender.

Risk to users within site curtilage would be reduced to **low**.

Risk to either staff or visitors should be increased to **medium** upon approach and departure to and from their place of work, particularly if on foot and even more so in hours of darkness.

This will be applicable to staff who are arriving for work, contractors, and delivery vehicles.

These risks form the basis of the identified design basis threats detailed below.

## Site Audit

An overview of recorded crime in the Bosworth, Ratby, Groby, Markfield and Stanton area uses the latest available Police.uk statistics. This data is always two months in arrears and March 2025 provides the latest figures. The data published by the Police are incidents that were reported in that month; other crimes may have been committed but not reported to the Police and are therefore unrecorded.

Violent crime dominates recorded crime type category, this category generally being the largest in an urban area. This is because the 'Violent Crime' category covers so many offences compared to 'acquisitive' type offending categories. When homing in to identify hot spot areas, concentrations are found mainly within residential areas in small clusters – often indicating numerous offences at a single address. In this case the violent crime category is associated with the surrounding residential areas in Markfield itself.

Nationally, a  $\frac{2}{3}$  to  $\frac{1}{3}$  crime type breakdown is typical when considering offences against the person as opposed to offences against property, with a 10% variation allowed to consider crime statistics to be within 'normal' range.

The crime pattern analysis for the Whitwick Road site confirms that the site is within national parameters for type breakdown and this confirmation allows crime data for wider area to be considered appropriate for this site.

Another important element for BREEAM accreditation is what effect the proposed development could have on the surrounding area, and how existing properties will interface with the development.

The proposed development of the site would be considered to enhance the current provision in the area for employment and enterprise opportunities and its proposed use integrates successfully into both its immediate and wider surroundings without conflict.

**The proposed development is considered to be an asset and not be detrimental to the community; it is highly likely this development will enhance the area.**

**This element of the BREEAM accreditation process can therefore be discharged.**

## Consultation

The Design Out Crime Officer for Leicestershire Police was contacted on 21 May 2025.

Their response is shown below

RE: DOCO Consultation - HEA06 BREEAM



Megan Wood (8796) <Megan.Wood@leics.police.uk>  
To: Jan Caton

Follow up. Start by 24 May 2025. Due by 24 May 2025.  
You replied to this message on 24/05/2025 16:36.

Reply Reply All Forward

Wed 21/05/2025 15:54

Hi Jan,

Thank you for your email.

I am thanking you!

A review of available crime statistics for the immediate area surrounding the proposed site indicates a low crime rate, with only a few incidents of public order offences and theft reported over the past year. The wider area of Markfield also maintains a low level of crime, averaging between 10 and 20 reported incidents per month. These typically include burglary, anti-social behaviour, and criminal damage.

The local policing department covering this area is Hinckley and Blaby, they also cover Bosworth, Ratby, Groby and Stanton. Their policing priorities at this time include anti-social behaviour, namely vehicle related, Road safety due to incidents of car cruises taking place within Markfield, and Rural crime including burglary.

I hope this is useful, if there is anything further I can do to assist, please let me know.

Kind regards

Megan  
Wood  
Leicestershire Police

8796

## General risks for site and user groups

Identified risks have been dealt with within recommendations but essentially mirror those of the neighbourhood (as below).

Identify risks specific to the proposed, likely or potential use of the building. This is likely to be staff and visitors on site.

As demonstrated by the crime statistics analysis, the proposed development location is in a **low** crime area.

## Site specific risks

The immediate area around Markfield shows some of the current crime trends.

- Anti-social behaviour
- Vehicle related crime.
- Criminal damage (including arson) against buildings.
- Theft or burglary from person or building.

## IDT's

| Risk Category                                                                                                                                                                              | Description                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Opportunist Theft:</b><br>Opportunistic offending without physical force or violence.                                                                                                   | A single threat actor attempts to gain illicit access to the building without forced entry or violence (usually by tailgating or distraction). The attacker would not carry significant tools or use techniques which causes noise.                                      |
| <b>Targeted theft:</b><br>Experienced forced entry using tools and/or violence.                                                                                                            | Single or multiple aggressors using concealable hand tools to attempt entry into the building. The attackers may be willing to generate some noise.                                                                                                                      |
| <b>Anti Social or Public Order Acts (including criminal damage)</b><br><br>Remaining external to premises or legitimate access whereupon offender(s) engage in disruptive actions/threats. | Single or multiple offenders.<br>Generally, by way of protest or disagreement, shouting obscenities, verbal threats etc.<br>Normally contained within main entrances, Reception and other publicly accessible areas.<br>Acts potentially driven by drink or drug misuse. |
| <b>Vehicle Crime</b><br>The site will have staff and visitor cars parked daily.<br><br>This is often a pre cursor to vehicle related offending.                                            | Single or multiple offenders.<br>Most likely to involve theft from rather than theft of vehicle.<br>A management regime of car checking to promote the 'empty cab' status will be highly beneficial long term.                                                           |

## Recommendations for security features.

The following security recommendations are based on all available information. The proposed new build development will have minimal impact on the surrounding buildings nearby.

Given the low-risk crime designation at this location, the requirements listed are deemed commensurate to risk and require incorporation within the build schedule to achieve BREEAM security requirements.

It should be noted the principles of the Secured by Design accreditation scheme have been used to inform the physical protection elements of this assessment. This may help to achieve any future DOCO recommendation, which may assist with the decision-making process when considering any future planning application.

As such, mandatory elements of the security need are **emphasised**.

The below requirements are generic – if the below are included within any future build specification, then compliance shall be achieved.

The requirements are for **all buildings** (6) as shown on the provided masterplan, unless shown by exception.

### i) Pedestrian Doors

Any door which provides access into or out of the building, must comply with either:-

Loss Prevention Standard 1175 Security Rating 2 (LPS1175 SR2 {B3})

Security Technical Standard 202 Burglary Rating 2 (STS 202 BR2)

LPS 2081 Security Rating B (LPS 2081 SR B)

## MANDATORY

### ii) Security Shutters

This applies to any shutters on a vehicular entrance. Loading bay doors are shown in the plans. Roller shutter doors providing access for deliveries and other entrances where no other door is present must be certificated to a minimum of:

LPS 1175 Security Rating 1 (issue 7) or A1 (issue 8).  
STS 202 Burglary Resistance 2, or  
Sold Secure – SS101 Gold

## **MANDATORY**

### **iii) Windows**

Any openable window forming part of the shell of the building must, as a minimum requirement, comply with the [PAS24 specification](#). This relates to **any window** that is less than 3.5m from ground level.

## **MANDATORY**

### **iv) Glazing units**

The laminated/laminated configuration is now the preferred option in most cases. This would become the preferred build up for glazing.

Double glazed units should achieve a 6mm/6mm build up as a minimum for security – although this is regularly exceeded by other loading or attenuation factors. Where a dual laminated configuration cannot be accommodated, then one pane of each glazing unit is to achieve the BS EN 356 P1A attack resistance standard.

This requirement would include all ground floor windows where ‘easily accessible’ criteria is achieved and irrespective of whether the window is fixed or openable.

## **MANDATORY**

### **v) Access Control and Core Protection**

Details are not known of any planned access control system.

The buildings should have a robust system, capable of data logging, to protect any secure areas such as office, warehouse and storage areas. The access control should cover the gated access to the staff car parks, rear access and any other vehicle or pedestrian entry gates.

The requirement for any system would be that it is designed and installed by a member of either the NSI or SSAIB accreditation schemes (see relevant information within the electronic security section below).

Effective access control is seen as essential to success (or otherwise) of any development. Access should be limited to individual areas and amenities according to where the user works or visits and is restricted elsewhere as required.

The UL293 standard would normally be followed but given there are only a limited number of companies currently providing a product that achieves this specification, I would accept an access control system that is compliant with BSEN 50133 security classification 2A (now archived). Furthermore, the installation should be compliant with the requirements of BS EN 60839.

Use of an NSI/SSAIB accredited company allows discharge of these requirements should core protection be added to the BREEAM accreditation process. (This would have to be subject to the future approval by the SQSS of any proposed system – the 2A classification requires the system includes destination control provision throughout, together with data logging facilities).

**MANDATORY if fully fitted**

**ADVISORY if fitted to Category A**

#### vi) Bin Storage

No detail is available for refuse storage.

If the refuse storage is to be located internally within the building envelope and at ground floor level, the access should be restricted by way of gate or door. It could also include a means of escape on the inner face – if electrically operated then an exit button is required. If manually operated, a thumb turn or similar would suffice. This is to prevent any user from being accidentally trapped.

**ADVISORY**

The store requires illumination. And where general lighting does not illuminate the store to CIBSE standards, then 2-stage lighting is preferred, where low levels of illumination are increased upon detection of motion.

Suitable levels of illumination would be 5 Lux constant and 30 Lux on motion sensing.

**ADVISORY**

If external storage is provided, the above would again apply and in addition, any flammable material used in the construction requires a fire retardant coating (no minimum standard applies – any retardant coating is sufficient).

This is deemed appropriate to mitigate against damage and arson offences.

#### **ADVISORY**

#### **vii) Cycle Storage**

Cycle storage provision is not shown on each plot. Where it is shown (Unit 200) it is external to the building envelope.

Any proposed cycle racks/stands must comply with the Sold Secure Silver standard (if Secured by Design is not conditioned, this can be relaxed to Bronze).

#### **MANDATORY**

External cycle storage should be covered by external CCTV and lighting.

#### **ADVISORY**

#### **viii) Lighting**

The lighting scheme for the site is not known, guidance re compliance is below.

Guidance in respect of lighting, both internal and external, should be obtained from either ILP or CIBSE documentation.

From a Secured by Design perspective, highways or public amenity areas must comply with BS5489:2020. Areas within curtilage must achieve (or exceed) either ILP or CIBSE minimum requirements. In addition, a 25% uniformity level should also be specified.

Any light source should be a minimum of Ra 60 on the colour rendition index. This ensures the light source is a white light.

If a temperature rating for LED lighting is offered, then the 4000 Kelvin option is preferred.

Any lighting installation should ensure that it complements any existing or proposed new CCTV system. If lighting is not designed to consider images from cameras, this can adversely affect image quality – both camera and luminaire specifications need to be carefully considered.

## **MANDATORY**

### **ix) Vehicle Provision**

Parking is available within the perimeter of each site, including accessible and EV bays. The parking is in front of the planned office space affording some informal surveillance from within the buildings.

Any staff and visitor parking areas should accommodate various vehicle sizes/types, the bays should be clearly marked with safe/additional pedestrian routes identified.

Pedestrian routes to and from any car parking area should meet the required lighting requirements.

Access to the parking should be controlled by a single vehicle access point which should have fob/card reader access for staff as part of the main access control system.

Using Parkmark principles would be seen as good practice.

## **ADVISORY**

### **x) Boundary/Perimeter Protection**

Perimeter security fencing and gates are the first line of defence around premises and is therefore considered to be vitally important. No detail shown re perimeter protection for this site.

The site sits within natural landscaping. Each unit should have defined perimeter and fencing. This should be 2.4 weld mesh and any gates, pedestrian and vehicular, must be the same height and of an appropriate standard:

LPS 1175 Security Rating 1 (SR1) or A1 or any equivalent.

#### **ADVISORY**

##### **xi) Manual security**

Each unit will have an office area. If individual units are to have a dedicated reception area this should be permanently resourced and staff should have the facility to warn of any disruption.

A hold up (panic) button should be installed for the protection of Reception staff. This area would benefit from electronic surveillance (CCTV).

A camera which provides identification standard images should be positioned to the Reception area and record visitors into this area.

If the Reception area is not staffed, then the entrance doors should remain closed.

To receive visitors, a video entry device should be installed at the main door to allow visitors to announce their arrival. This will also allow staff to view and provide or deny access based on these images.

#### **ADVISORY**

##### **xii) Electronic Security**

Any electronic security system must be installed by a contractor that is registered under either the NSI or SSAIB accreditation schemes.

[www.nsi.org.uk](http://www.nsi.org.uk)

[www.ssaib.org.uk](http://www.ssaib.org.uk)

Where a new CCTV system is to be installed as part of any shell or core fit and is a standalone system, the requirements for this system would be that;

- Devices are securely stored in a restricted area of the building.
- The recording device has a means of export.
- Exports have operating software automatically burnt onto the disc or stick.
- Cameras will be of 16CIF quality.

- Complies with a minimum of BS62676 at Grade 2.
- Is registered with the Information Commissioners office if required ([www.ico.gov.uk](http://www.ico.gov.uk)) to check. Your accredited installer will advise.
- If primary images are to be stored on site, it is recommended a 28-day retention period be designed in. Should primary storage of images be off site, then a 7-day secondary (onsite) retention period would be acceptable.

#### **ADVISORY**

##### **xiii) Intruder Facility**

Any intruder alarm installed in the units should meet a minimum standard.

To comply with BS 50133 at a minimum of the Grade 2 standard.

**MANDATORY** – if fully fitted

## Other Considerations

### Counter Terrorism

At the time of issue, the threat level for international terrorism in the UK set by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) was set at **SUBSTANTIAL** <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels>, meaning an attack is highly likely.

The proposed location is not considered to be in an area of heightened risk or a Counter terror issue.

The terrorism threat posed to this development is deemed **Low**.

There are no identifiable neighbouring properties in the area of the site which would be deemed as of an increased risk.

**Whilst some elements of the design are not fully known, the design of the buildings examined under this assessment shows regard for both safety of person and security of property.**

**Given all the above mandatory elements are included, I confirm that security credits available under the BREEAM scheme could be claimed.**

**This report has been produced based on all information collated and by way of subsequent correspondence. Should any amendment to the design or build specification be necessary, KABSEC should be notified in order that the security assessment may be modified as required.**

This report has been produced based on all information collated, including but not restricted to, site drawings, plans and associated documents, virtual site visit and environmental visual audit. Where necessary, the SQSS should be notified in order that this security assessment can be modified as required.




t/a KABSEC Consultancy.

## Appendix A

### Bosworth, Ratby, Groby, Markfield and Stanton Neighbourhood area

Source - Police.uk

Wider area March 2025



## Headline Data – March 2025


### Top reported crimes

Most commonly reported crimes during Mar 2025

|                              |    |
|------------------------------|----|
| Violence and sexual offences | 78 |
| Anti-social behaviour        | 39 |
| Criminal damage and arson    | 22 |
| Vehicle crime                | 19 |

## 12 Months Crime Data, whole of neighbourhood.

April 2024 – March 2025




## 36 months neighbourhood data.

May 2022 – March 2025

| Type                         | Total | Percentage |
|------------------------------|-------|------------|
| Anti-social behaviour        | 614   | 8.6%       |
| Burglary                     | 530   | 7.5%       |
| Criminal damage and arson    | 732   | 10.3%      |
| Drugs                        | 119   | 1.7%       |
| Other theft                  | 540   | 7.6%       |
| Possession of weapons        | 45    | 0.6%       |
| Public order                 | 660   | 9.3%       |
| Robbery                      | 18    | 0.3%       |
| Shoplifting                  | 164   | 2.3%       |
| Vehicle crime                | 654   | 9.2%       |
| Violence and sexual offences | 2794  | 39.3%      |
| Other crime                  | 195   | 2.7%       |
| Bicycle theft                | 23    | 0.3%       |
| Theft from the person        | 20    | 0.3%       |

Appendix B, Condensed Area Data, March 2025– Police.uk



Crime Breakdown.

4 crimes shown in close proximity to the site.

Figures in the immediate vicinity are lower than the overall neighbourhood figures considered for this site risk analysis.

## Appendix C

### Useful Standards

#### Alarms

BS EN 50131 - 4 grades (to accommodate all EU requirements)

- |                                           |                                                  |
|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| 1. Low Risk Site                          | (no response achievable – of little value in UK) |
| 2. Standard Domestic/Low Risk Commercial  | (e.g. Florist/Newsagent)                         |
| 3. High Risk Domestic/Standard Commercial | (e.g. IT company/Financial Institution)          |
| 4. High Risk Commercial                   | (e.g. Jewellers)                                 |

BS 6799 - wire free systems

Don't forget to refer to the NSI and SSAIB accreditation schemes

[www.nsi.org.uk](http://www.nsi.org.uk)

[www.ssaib.org.uk](http://www.ssaib.org.uk)

Both provide postcode search facility for specific localities.

#### Buildings

Loss Prevention Standard 1175 (LPS 1175 – 8 security ratings)

Intruder Resistance, strong rooms, security grilles, shutters etc.

The security rating system is loosely based upon: -

- |                                            |                                                     |
|--------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| Domestic risk 1 and 2                      | (where 1 is low and 2 is high risk)                 |
| Commercial risk 2, 3 and 4                 | (2, Florist, 3, School, Designer outlet, 4 Chemist) |
| Higher security risks 5 and 6              | (High value Jewellers, Banks, Post Offices)         |
| Extremely high security facilities 7 and 8 | (Bullion sites etc.)                                |

BS6262 - Glazing for Buildings (curtain walling etc.).

#### CCTV

(NSI and SSAIB accreditation is also applicable for CCTV)

- |          |                                                  |
|----------|--------------------------------------------------|
| BS 7958  | Code of Practice                                 |
| BS 8495  | Export of Digital Images                         |
| BS 8418  | Remote Monitoring Stations                       |
| BS 62676 | CCTV/Video Surveillance in security applications |

#### Doors

|            |                                                  |
|------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| PAS24:2022 | Residential. (Door sets to comply with PAS 23-1) |
| LPS2081    |                                                  |

|         |            |
|---------|------------|
| LPS1175 | Commercial |
| STS 202 |            |

## Fencing

BS1722

Part 1 Chain Link

Part 2 Wire Mesh

Part 10 Anti intruder fences

Part 12 Steel Palisade

LPS 1175

National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) Perimeter Security & Access Control Guidance

## Lighting

BS5489:2020 Public Amenity Areas.

Other Areas <https://theilp.org.uk/publication/lighting-against-crime/>

Guidance from either the Institute of Lighting Professionals (ILP) or the Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers (CIBSE) are regularly used for lighting schemes.

Subject to illumination and uniformity levels complying with any SQSS minimum requirement, then use of ILP or CIBSE levels are deemed satisfactory for average crime and below average crime locations.

## Locks

| Standard                                | Function                                                                                                                                                           | Comments                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>BS 3621:2007</b><br>(key egress)     | Locked by key from both sides                                                                                                                                      | Provided that the key is removed, this type of lock is secure against operation by intruders reaching through a letter-plate, breaking nearby glazing etc. Best used where emergency escape is not required or where other means of escape exist and where security is paramount.                        |
| <b>BS 8621:2007</b><br>(keyless egress) | Locked by key from outside only; can always be opened from the inside without a key – e.g. via a thumb turn or lever.                                              | This type of lock offers emergency escape without a key at all times. Best used where there is no danger of the inside handle or thumb-turn being operated from the outside by, for instance, breaking a glazed panel, reaching through a letter plate etc. and where safety is critical (e.g. in flats) |
| <b>BS 10621:2007</b><br>(dual mode)     | Locked by key from outside only; can be opened from inside without a key EXCEPT when this function has been disabled by a positive key operation from the outside. | Combines ease of escape in emergency with an additional security feature for use ONLY when leaving the premises unoccupied. Best used where an alternative means of escape exists. BS 10621 offers:<br><br>security <i>and</i> safety<br>protection of properties when vacant                            |

**Euro Cylinders**

|        |               |    |
|--------|---------------|----|
| TS 007 | 3 Star        | or |
| SS 312 | Diamond Grade |    |

**Padlocks**

|         |                                                                                         |
|---------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| EN12320 | Standard Padlock Grades 1-6<br>Regular to extra high security including closed shackle. |
|---------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

**Windows**

|                       |                              |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|
| PAS24:2016<br>STS 204 | Windows of enhanced security |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|

Windows must also comply with: -

|         |                                             |
|---------|---------------------------------------------|
| BS 4873 | Aluminium performance standard              |
| BS 7412 | PVCu performance standard                   |
| BS 644  | Timber performance standard                 |
| BS 6510 | Steel performance standard                  |
| BS 8213 | Code of Practice re install of PVCu windows |

**Glass and glazing** (general security requirements – not including effect of blast)

|                                               |                                  |
|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| BS EN 356(2000) Anti-bandit security glazing. |                                  |
| Domestic                                      | BS EN 356 P1A                    |
| Commercial                                    | BS EN 356 P1A                    |
| LPS 1270                                      | Security Glazing & Glazing Films |
| BS 6206                                       | Toughened Glass                  |
| BS EN 12150                                   | Toughened Glass                  |
| BS EN 14179                                   | Heat soaked toughened glass      |
| BS EN 14449                                   | Laminated glass                  |
| BS EN 12543                                   | Laminated glass                  |

\*This standards section may not incorporate all standards specified.

It is intended to be used purely as an aide memoire – specific standards are included within the main body of the assessment security recommendation section (within the building security requirement section above).

## Appendix D


### Site Information



## Site Images

Source – Google Earth/maps.

N.B. Limited Streetview data available in the area.



### 1. View down Whitwick Road



### 2. White Hill Farm access from Whitwick Road



### 3. Junction with Priory Lane and Cottage Lane



### 4. A50 – Access point to the site



## 5. A50 approach to Junction 22 M1



## Appendix E

### SQSS Credentials

#### Suitably Qualified Security Specialist

An individual achieving 1–3 or all of the following can be considered to be suitably qualified for the purposes of compliance with BREEAM:

1. *Minimum of three years' experience in a relevant security profession (in the last five years). This experience must clearly demonstrate a practical understanding of factors affecting security in relation to construction and the built environment, relevant to the type and scale of the project being undertaken.*
2. *Holds a qualification relevant to security.*
3. *Maintains a full membership to a relevant professional body, institute or certification scheme that has a professional code of conduct, to which members adhere.*
4. *A specialist registered with a BREEAM recognised third-party licensing or registration scheme for security specialists.*

The SQSS may be any practising security professional (e.g. a private security consultant or advisor, a Police DOCO, CTSA, or an individual associated with the client team), however they must demonstrate that they hold the experience, qualifications and memberships required by the SQSS criteria.

When appointing the SQSS, consideration should be given to the appropriateness of the individual to carry out the task assigned. The SQSS should be able to demonstrate that they have experience dealing with similar projects with equal security levels and similar risk.

**SQSS Credentials for Kevin Burrows, KABSEC Consultancy are shown below:**



The SQSS has been an SBD Licensed Consultant for 9 Years



The SQSS is a full member of the Security Institute



### ProQual Level 5 Diploma in Crime Prevention - Designing Out Crime

has been awarded to

**Kevin Burrows**

31 / 10 / 2019

An award of ProQual AB Ltd, accredited by Ofqual  
603/3158/6

European Qualifications Framework Level 5

Certificate number 167684

Pam Lewis  
Director of Qualifications  
ProQual AB Ltd


**ofqual**  
REGULATED  
register.ofqual.gov.uk

ProQual AB Ltd, Company Registration Number: 07464445

The SQSS is BREEAM NC V6 compliant.



The SQSS has been a full member of the ASC for 8 years



The SQSS is registered as a SABRE assessor.

